



Banditry or business? Rebel labor markets and state economic intervention

Chelsea L. Estancona

To cite this article: Chelsea L. Estancona (2022) Banditry or business? Rebel labor markets and state economic intervention, *International Interactions*, 48:1, 139-151, DOI: [10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454](https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2021.1973454>



View supplementary material [↗](#)



Published online: 12 Oct 2021.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



Article views: 373



View related articles [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



Citing articles: 1 View citing articles [↗](#)

RESEARCH NOTE



Banditry or business? Rebel labor markets and state economic intervention

Chelsea L. Estancona

University of South Carolina

ABSTRACT

Stationary banditry is ubiquitous in civil war, with some rebel groups even investing in and profiting from primary commodities for years or decades. But for many of these groups, labor is a necessary component of resource production, such that laborers' economic participation is vital for rebel funding and survival. States, meanwhile, are eager to prevent rebels from establishing these economic footholds. In areas where rebels can assert control of primary commodity markets, military competition between states and rebels may be supplemented by economic competition over laborers' efforts. Under what conditions do governments wage local economic war by providing incentives to laborers to minimize the appeal of economically partnering with rebels? I argue that laborers' economic loyalty is a central and under-considered component to resource-driven conflicts. When rebels seek to establish stationary banditry, states incentivize laborers to participate in the legal economy rather than rebel-controlled markets. Specifically, states will pursue economic counterinsurgency policies in areas where rebels are most likely to profit from labor-intensive primary commodities. I find support for this argument using municipal-level Colombian data about the FARC's involvement in the coca trade and government provision of agricultural credits.

KEYWORDS

Civil War; Rebel Governance;
Counterinsurgency; Political
Economy of Conflict

El bandolerismo estacionario es omnipresente en la guerra civil, y algunos grupos rebeldes incluso invierten en productos básicos y se benefician de ellos durante años o décadas. No obstante, para muchos de estos grupos, el trabajo es un componente necesario de la producción de recursos, de modo que la participación económica de los trabajadores es clave para la financiación y la supervivencia de los rebeldes. Por su parte, los Estados ansían impedir que los rebeldes establezcan este tipo de apoyo económico. En las zonas donde los rebeldes pueden imponer el control de los mercados de productos básicos, la competencia militar entre los Estados y los rebeldes se puede complementar con la competencia económica por el esfuerzo de los trabajadores. ¿En qué condiciones los gobiernos desatan una guerra económica local al ofrecer incentivos a los trabajadores afin de minimizar el atractivo de asociarse a nivel económico con los rebeldes? Sostengo que la lealtad económica de los trabajadores

es un componente fundamental y poco considerado en los conflictos relacionados con los recursos. Cuando los rebeldes pretenden imponer un bandolerismo estacionario, los Estados incentivan a los trabajadores a participar en la economía legal en lugar de en los mercados controlados por los rebeldes. En concreto, los Estados promulgarán políticas de contrainsurgencia económica en las zonas donde los rebeldes tienen más probabilidades de beneficiarse de los productos básicos que requieren mucha mano de obra. Respaldo este argumento mediante datos que compartió Colombia a nivel municipal sobre la participación de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) en el comercio de coca y la provisión de créditos agrícolas por parte del gobierno.

Le banditisme stationnaire est omniprésent dans les guerres civiles, certains groupes rebelles investissant dans et profitant même des produits primaires pendant des années ou des décennies. Mais pour nombre de ces groupes, la main-d'œuvre est une composante nécessaire à la production de ressources, et la participation économique des travailleurs est donc essentielle au financement et à la survie de ces rebelles. Dans le même temps, les États souhaitent ardemment empêcher les rebelles d'établir ces points d'ancrage économiques. Dans les zones où les rebelles peuvent affirmer leur contrôle sur les marchés des produits primaires, la concurrence militaire entre les États et les rebelles peut être complétée par une concurrence économique sur les efforts des travailleurs. Dans quelles conditions les gouvernements mènent-ils une guerre économique locale en offrant des incitations aux travailleurs pour minimiser l'attrait d'un partenariat économique avec les rebelles ? Je soutiens que la loyauté économique des travailleurs est une composante centrale et insuffisamment prise en considération dans les conflits reposant sur des ressources. Lorsque les rebelles cherchent à établir un banditisme stationnaire, les États incitent les travailleurs à participer à l'économie légale plutôt qu'aux marchés contrôlés par les rebelles. Plus précisément, les États mèneront des politiques économiques de contre-insurrection dans les zones où les rebelles sont les plus susceptibles de tirer profit des produits primaires exigeant beaucoup de main-d'œuvre. J'ai trouvé du soutien à cet argument en m'appuyant sur des données colombiennes au niveau municipal concernant l'implication des FARC dans le commerce de la coca et l'octroi de crédits agricoles par le gouvernement.

Groups with long term investments in primary commodities – such as the FARC or the Taliban – are some of the most durable and powerful militant organizations (Humphreys 2005; Lujala 2010). Such commodities can provide the capital necessary to increase recruitment or invest in otherwise inaccessible military technology (Staniland 2012; Weinstein 2005). Yet, many lucrative commodities are labor-intensive, meaning that rebels often require labor to profit. If rebels' profit is contingent on laborers' efforts, states should invest resources to prevent or disrupt rebel – laborer economic cooperation. Changes

in laborers' economic loyalties due to competing incentives from rebels and the state can erode local governance, alter the conflict-level balance of power, and increase conflict duration.

Rebels' enduring success in commodity markets depends on their control of the supply chain, for which 'stationary banditry' – consistent territorial control allowing rebels to engage in long-term economic extraction – is often necessary (Olson 1993; Sanchez De La Sierra 2020). Among other benefits, stationary banditry provides access to labor markets for farming, mining, or other forms of work depending on the commodity type. However, consistent labor is not guaranteed, as changes in the security environment or the relative appeal of licit vs. illicit production can undermine rebels' economic relationships with laborers. States often preempt shifts in rebel power with military might (Carter 2015; Fearon 1995). But in conflicts where rebels seek to establish stationary banditry of primary commodities, states can also be expected to preemptively remove rebels' economic base. In short, when rebels depend on primary commodity wealth, states will engage in economic counterinsurgency to minimize future rebel capacity.

One means of discouraging laborer-rebel cooperation is by increasing the attractiveness of legal economic opportunities with incentives such as tax cuts, additional welfare programming, or credits (Dube and Vargas 2013). Rebels, in turn, offer economic incentives such as wages and security against the state for production of lucrative but illegally marketed commodities (Peters 2010; Rodado 2006). Rebels offer economic 'contracts'¹ for labor when they are active in territories that already produce or can produce valuable primary commodities. Laborers must weigh economic and security tradeoffs when considering employment in the illicit or legal sectors. I hypothesize that to discourage laborers from partnering with rebels, states will offer economic incentives in areas where these rebel-labor contracts are most likely to form. Thus, the political and military conflict between rebel groups and the state can evolve into an economic one over local labor markets.

Rebel-Labor Contracts and Government Economic Intervention

Rebel reliance on primary commodities to fund their endeavors is a common phenomenon and well established in the intrastate conflict literature (Arnson and Zartman 2005; Fearon 2005; Fjelde and Nilsson 2012; Hinkkainen and Kreutz 2019; Snyder and Bhavnani 2005; Wright 2016). Rebels' access to lucrative commodities differs depending on commodity type, group origin, and group longevity. However, where possible, groups seeking stationary banditry and financial stability capitalize on existing

¹While rebels' relationship with laborers may not entail formal contracts, these economic relationships are generally still governed by rules and norms akin to social contracts in war (Arjona 2016).

markets for the extraction and sale of lucrative goods.² In turn, groups that gain territorial access to labor-intensive primary commodities make use of existing labor markets to efficiently produce, trade, and profit (Arjona 2016).³ These markets persist due to high global demand for goods such as gemstones or drug crops.

Access to territory containing agricultural crops, illicit drug crops (Dube, Garcia-Ponce, and Thom 2016; Dube and Vargas 2013; Mejia and Restrepo 2013), mined resources (Rigterink 2020) or other types of lucrative primary commodities allows militant groups to form partnerships with the laborers producing these commodities (Arnson and Zartman 2005; Collier 2000; Sanchez De La Sierra 2020). The Taliban, for example, first partnered with local farmers and community leaders to increase existing opium production and manage transportation out of opium-rich localities, even in territories not fully under Taliban control (Azam 2016; Jackson 2018; Peters 2010).⁴ Militant groups strike deals with civilians by offering security and a share of increased profits from rebels' investments. Resource wealth may allow groups to provide benefits that the local licit economy cannot match. For example, in some Colombian municipalities, the rebel-led illicit economy eclipsed the legal economy during the conflict as laborers participated in FARC or ELN-led drug production (Rangel Suarez 2000).

Rebel-labor contracts are consistent with the literature detailing state-building in conflict environments (Mampilly 2011; Olson 1993; Sanchez De La Sierra 2020). Much like states, rebels form social contracts with civilians that dictate the norms of daily life (Arjona 2016; Loyle and Binningsbo 2018; Stewart 2018). Rebels may alternatively coerce a degree of cooperation through violence against noncombatants, but this strategy is militarily costly, damaging to groups' reputations, and may impact the availability of future labor (De la Calle 2017; Kalyvas 2006; Stewart and Liou 2017; Wood 2010, 2014). Given that sustained coercion is costly, militants seek mutually profitable and minimally costly partnerships with laborers in the territory in which they operate.

However, rebels' economic ties are not uniform across communities or over time. Civilians' willingness to labor in illicit, rebel-controlled markets is dependent on factors such as rebels' ability to establish secure, consistent stationary banditry, rebels' ability to provide sufficient payment (Estancona

²All rebel groups require funding to sustain the fight for their political goals. Not all groups, however, will be able to or desire to hold territory. This paper focuses on groups with territorial aims that operate in states capable of producing lucrative primary commodities.

³The importance of consistent access to a specific territory depends on commodity type. For example, for rebels to maintain their profit from labor-intensive mined resources, they must be able to hold or access the territory containing these mines. For agricultural products such as drug crops, however, rebels may be able to encourage new planting as they move to new communities so long as the terrain allows for cultivation.

⁴I focus on the labor needed to produce militants' goods as a necessary first step in rebels' supply chains. However, distributors, public officials, and community leaders may also be key actors with whom the militant group and the state can interact.

2021; Dal Bo and Dal Bo), and the comparable value of the legal economy (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Wright 2016). Although working in illicit markets is likely more profitable for laborers than the legal economy (Dube, Garcia-Ponce, and Thom 2016), such employment is unreliable and carries security risks. Particularly if rebels' promises of long-term wages or protection from the state while farming or mining are not credible, laborers may consider alternative economic options. Variation in rebels' territorial control or presence, laborers' preferences, and state strength can all alter laborers' decisions about their economic future. Further, the tenuous nature of rebel-laborer contracts provide opportunities for the state to increase the relative appeal of the legal economy and limit rebels' access to necessary labor.

Rebel-labor contracts pose a distinct risk for governments fighting civil wars. If these partnerships fund rebels' ability to consolidate territory, establish access to commodity markets, and amplify recruitment efforts, states can be expected to take steps to prevent their establishment. States employ a variety of counterinsurgency tactics to prevent rebel and civilian cooperation, including conventional military action, direct coercion of civilians, or individual economic aid to 'win hearts and minds' (Berman, Shapiro, and Felter 2011; Lyall 2010; Lyall, Zhou, and Imai 2020). However, there may be limited military access to territory where rebels engage in stationary banditry, making alternative tactics such as direct action against rebels or effective civilian repression more costly and challenging. States also face constraints from their constituents and international observers on the use of violence against civilians to coerce behavior (Gartner and Regan 1996; Ritter 2014; Shaver and Shapiro 2021). A useful alternative where rebels can form economic relationships with civilians is to alter laborers' decision calculus by increasing the appeal of legal economic participation (Dube and Vargas 2013). Economic incentives such as agricultural credits can be an effective, non-coercive counterinsurgency strategy to supplement state efforts to provide security to civilians. These policies raise the value of competing offers rebels must extend to civilians to gain access to labor-intensive resources, making rebel-labor cooperation more expensive and unlikely.

Such efforts may have limited impact where rebels' territorial control and economic extraction is well established, but they are designed specifically to erode rebels' economic base by mitigating rebels' ability to make satisfactory counter-offers of payment and security. This is not to suggest that states fully substitute one counterinsurgency tool for another, as states often use multiple tactics at once. However, I argue that states are more likely to employ economic counterinsurgency in areas with rebel economic activity when compared to areas where rebels have not invested in local labor markets. While other counterinsurgency approaches focus on rebels' military capacity and support, these target the civilian base of rebel funding: the labor necessary to produce valuable primary commodities. In keeping with this argument about

state intervention to prevent or limit rebel-labor contracts, I hypothesize the following

H: Governments will provide economic incentives to laborers in territory where rebels profit from labor-intensive resources.

Empirical Test: Rebels' Labor in Colombia

An appropriate test of this hypothesis will demonstrate that the government provides economic incentives to increase the appeal of the legal economy relative to local, rebel-controlled illegal production. More specifically, a convincing empirical test requires a case with sub-state variation in several components: rebel presence, rebel-managed primary commodities, and the application of such economic incentives. The Colombian conflict satisfies these conditions. First, access to lucrative natural resources in the form of drug crops provided militant groups with significant profit. Further, rebels required large amounts of consistent labor to produce coca crops for profit. Finally, there is sufficient territorial variation in FARC presence, territorial competition, and legal economic opportunity.

Over the conflict's 60-plus year duration, rebels' access to primary commodities – specifically, to coca – was a central concern in military policy against these militant groups. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC), the primary leftist group fighting the state, managed the growth and sale of coca for significant profit. Economic cooperation between the FARC and coca farmers provided the group with efficient, sustained access to raw coca for eventual sale (Mejia and Restrepo 2013; Mejia and Rico 2010). This increased both the group's anticipated profit and farmers' economic security. In turn, these profits impacted the rebels' ability to secure the territory in question, take additional territory, and strike future bargains with other growers.

For the Colombian state, disrupting the FARC's source of power depended not only on military action, but also on discouraging farmers' collaboration with the group. I hypothesized above that states will allocate economic incentives where militant groups can capitalize on labor-intensive commodities to encourage laborers to instead continue participation in the state-monitored economy. To rephrase my hypothesis in the context of this specific case, the Colombian government should provide economic incentives to encourage legal commodity farming as a means of diminishing the relative gains from coca growing – focusing on areas where coca farming benefits the FARC. In the early 2000s, the Colombian government implemented several programs to minimize coca farming and support sustainable, alternative economic growth, particularly in municipalities likely to benefit the FARC's economic base (UNODC 2014). Specifically, I capture the economic component of the state's

Table 1. Average Value of Agricultural Credits Provided by Municipality Type.

	No Coca	Coca
No FARC	516.84	47.63
FARC	982.98	913.10

counterinsurgency strategy by assessing variation in the Colombian government's provision of agricultural credits.

To measure coca crop presence, FARC presence, and the value of agricultural credits provided, I turn to data from the Universidad de los Andes' Centro de Estudios sobre el Desarrollo Económico (Center for the Study of Economic Development, or CEDE) (Facultad de Economía: Centro de Datos 2015). This institute collects yearly, municipal-level data on geography, governance, socio-economic conditions and conflict indicators. The dependent variable measures the value of agricultural and livestock credits provided by the Colombian Department of Agriculture to farmers in each municipality. These credits were provided to encourage and support farms of all sizes engaged in producing legal crops.⁵ I choose this measure to best capture the state's extension of economic resources to decrease the appeal of coca farming for the FARC relative to other forms of legal crop growth.

The primary independent variables capture the growth of coca and the presence of the FARC, the conflict's main rebel group. The Colombian government had an interest in limiting coca production overall, which makes it important that the test single out efforts to decrease the FARC's anticipated coca profit. Testing that the state sought to co-opt the FARC's labor markets requires additional information about the FARC's location, measured here as a dummy variable indicating FARC presence in the municipality in a given year. This is important for two reasons. First, the Colombian state should be expected to allocate more resources toward coopting coca farmers in the areas where access to these labor markets will most benefit the FARC. The theory indicates that in order to reduce the FARC's profits, the Colombian state should focus on co-opting laborers (coca farmers) in these areas. The distribution of the value of credits, included in Table 1, demonstrates that the Colombian state invested a greater amount in areas with FARC presence. Descriptively, the highest average values – not accounting for any additional municipality characteristics – are in municipalities where the FARC is active, recorded coca growth notwithstanding. This is in keeping with the theory, as the Colombian state is expected to preempt bargains between farmers and the FARC as well as disrupt existing economic contracts.⁶

⁵The results of models discussed are invariant to alternate measures such as the number of credits provided or the value of credits to only small landholders (see the supplemental online appendix).

⁶Measuring coca growth is also most difficult in municipalities where the FARC is present, which may result in undercounting of credits in areas where coca is present but not recorded.

The data is available over the time span 2000–2008, with 1,122 municipalities covered. The total number of observations in the model is 10,039. Due to the continuous but positive nature of the dependent variable, I log-transform the value of credits provided and estimate the model with ordinary least squares (OLS).⁷ Given the length of Colombia's civil war, the sample rarely captures the FARC's initial presence in a municipality. However, once observed in a municipality, the FARC is not always consistently present. This indicates that territorial presence – much less control – may not be consistent. Because of this, the dependent variable is led by one year relative to all independent variables to capture the effect of FARC's status and coca growth in the previous year on the current year's agricultural credits.⁸ Year and municipality fixed effects are also included to account for other, unobserved sources of spatial and temporal heterogeneity that may impact the state's provision of credits.⁹

I hypothesized that states will provide additional economic incentives in territories where rebels can profit from primary commodities to prevent or break up deals between rebels and would-be local labor markets. Agricultural credits should be extended to small farmers with whom the FARC can collaborate to grow coca for eventual sale. To test this, I include an interaction term between the dummy for FARC presence and the presence of coca growth.¹⁰ In areas without FARC involvement, the Colombian state should be less likely to provide credits, as illegal crop production does not benefit the rebel group and increase its earnings and military efforts. As such, the Colombian state should predominantly engage in economic counterinsurgency in municipalities with both coca crops and FARC presence.

The results in [Table 2](#) suggest that increased investment in agricultural credits occurs in coca growing municipalities – but only where the FARC is active. Coca alone is not enough to prompt a strong state response: agricultural credits are a counterinsurgency tactic to reduce the relative appeal of working for the rebel group. [Figure 1](#) illustrates this phenomenon, plotting the average predicted value of credits by municipality type.¹¹ The highest value of agricultural credits are provided in FARC municipalities with coca presence, followed by municipalities where the FARC is active but coca is not (yet) grown. Substantively, the value of credits supplied in FARC municipalities where coca is present is roughly double the value provided in municipalities with coca crops but no FARC activity. This is further evidence

⁷Logit models for whether or not credits are provided in a given municipality can also be found in the supplemental online with similar results.

⁸The length of time between changes in coca growth or FARC entry and policy implementation is unclear. Results do not change when using concurrent measures.

⁹ Additional versions of this model with control variables, alternate measures of coca production, and clustered standard errors can be found in the supplemental online.

¹⁰Below, in [Table 2](#), I include models with both a dummy for coca growth and the number of hectares of coca grown.

¹¹The average value of credits provided across all municipalities is 147.5. Descriptive statistics can be found in [Table A6](#) in the appendix.

Table 2. Agricultural Credits Provided in FARC and Coca Growing Municipalities.

	Dependent variable:	
	Value of Agricultural Credits (1)	(2)
FARC Presence	− 0.023 (0.041)	− 0.029 (0.041)
Coca Presence	− 0.199** (0.085)	
ln(Coca Hectares)		− 0.099*** (0.023)
FARC x Coca Presence	0.206** (0.092)	
FARC x ln(Coca Hectares)		0.054*** (0.019)
Constant	7.615*** (0.421)	7.623*** (0.421)
Observations	10,039	10,056
Note:	* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01	




Figure 1. Value of Agricultural Credits by Municipality Type, 95% CIs.

that the Colombian state provides such credits as a form of economic counterinsurgency directed at reducing the FARC's profit. An alternate, continuous measure of coca hectares in the second model of [Table 2](#) lends support to this interpretation. Increasing the hectares of coca grown is associated with an overall decrease in the value of agricultural credits, but this relationship is reversed where the FARC is present to capitalize on coca production.

The FARC's territorial presence alone does not have a statistically significant effect, suggesting that credit provision is specifically tied to discouraging would-be coca farmers from working with the rebel group. As hypothesized, the Colombian state seeks to sway the FARC's source of labor by concentrating their provision of agricultural credits to farmers in territory where coca is grown and the FARC is active. Though these credits were available in other municipalities, their significant provision in territory with economic value to the FARC illustrates competition over local labor markets between the state and the rebel group. The government provides credits to break up or prevent rebel-labor economic contracts and limit the FARC's attainable profit.

Conclusion

Coca farmers were central actors in the conflict between the FARC and the Colombian state. The FARC relied on labor intensive coca farming to earn profit that equipped them to pose a real military threat. Recognizing this, the Colombian state engaged in economic counterinsurgency to oubid the FARC for farmers' labor. While government provision of agricultural credits was not explicit counterinsurgency policy, these credits were largely applied in areas where the FARC sought to co-opt farmers and increase their supply of lucrative coca. The theory and results presented here demonstrate the importance of this localized economic conflict as a key component of the broader military conflict.

Although the results are from a single case, the argument applies to a broad swathe of intrastate conflicts despite variation in rebels' stated goals, types of labor-intensive resources, and state characteristics. When rebels fund themselves by engaging in stationary banditry, it is in states' interest to slow the growth of rebel economies and limit rebels' future profit. If labor is necessary to produce these goods, states can disrupt rebels' supply chain by making it more difficult for rebels to gain laborers' economic loyalty. Rebel-labor partnerships are a form of economic contract, and states make these contracts more expensive for rebels by decreasing their appeal relative to laborers' other employment options. Other options such as military clashes or violent repression can be prohibitively costly or impractical in certain areas. While states often simultaneously pursue a variety of counterinsurgency strategies, economic incentives have been under-considered as a means of altering the

trajectory of intrastate conflict and may be particularly effective in resource-based conflicts.

Significant opportunities remain to investigate labor markets and state economic intervention in civil wars. Next topics might include the nature of economic incentives extended by either states or rebels, sources of laborers' organizational capacity and bargaining power, or different forms of contracts across rebels' supply chain (e.g. middlemen or transporters). Given the pervasive nature of labor intensive resources in global conflicts, better understanding laborers' centrality to rebel economies and the effects of state intervention carries important policy implications. Economic interventions – which may also increase local welfare – can be a cost-effective counterinsurgency policy for states and their allies to consider.

References

- Arjona, A. 2016. *Rebelocracy: Social Order in the Colombian Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Arnson, C., and W. Zartman, eds. 2005. *Rethinking the Economics of War: The Intersection of Need, Creed and Greed*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Azam, A. 2016. "Penetrating Every Stage of Afghan Opium Chain, Taliban Become a Cartel." *The New York Times*. Accessed 16 February 2018. <http://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/17/world/asia/afghanistan-opium-taliban-drug-cartel.html>
- Berman, E., J. Shapiro, and J. Felter. 2011. "Can Hearts and Minds Be Bought? the Economics of Counterinsurgency in Iraq." *Journal of Political Economy* 119 (4): 4. doi:10.1086/661983
- Carter, D. 2015. "When Terrorism Is Evidence of State Success: Securing the State against Territorial Groups." *Oxford Economic Papers* 67 (1): 116–132. doi:10.1093/oep/gpu041
- Collier, P. 2000. "Rebellion as a Quasi-Criminal Activity." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44 (6): 839–53. doi:10.1177/0022002700044006008
- Dal Bó, E., and P. Dal Bó. 2011. "Workers, Warriors, and Criminals: Social Conflict in General Equilibrium." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 9 (4): 646–77. doi:10.1111/j.1542-4774.2011.01025.x
- De la Calle, L. 2017. "Compliance Vs. Constraints: A Theory of Rebel Targeting in Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 54 (3): 427–41. doi:10.1177/0022343316686823
- Dube, O., and J.F. Vargas. 2013. "Commodity Price Shocks and Civil Conflict: Evidence from Colombia." *The Review of Economic Studies* 80 (4): 1384–421. doi:10.1093/restud/rdt009
- Dube, O., O. Garcia-Ponce, and K. Thom. 2016. "From Maize to Haze: Agricultural Shocks and the Growth of the Mexican Drug Sector." *Journal of the European Economic Association* 14 (5): 1181–224. doi:10.1111/jeea.12172
- Estancona, C. 2021. "Rebel Primary Commodity Markets, Price Shocks, and Supplier Vic-Timization." Unpublished draft. *International Studies Quarterly*, 0(1-13). <https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/>
- Fearon, J.D. 1995. "Rationalist Explanations for War." *International Organization* 49 (3): 379–414. doi:10.1017/S0020818300033324
- Fearon, J.D. 2005. "Primary Commodity Exports and Civil War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 483–507. doi:10.1177/0022002705277544
- Fjelde, H., and D. Nilsson. 2012. "Rebels against Rebels: Explaining Violence between Rebel Groups." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 56 (4): 604–28. doi:10.1177/0022002712439496

- Gartner, S., and P. Regan. 1996. "Threat and Repression: The Non-Linear Relationship between Government and Opposition Violence." *Journal of Peace Research* 33 (3): 273–87. doi:10.1177/0022343396033003003
- Hinkkainen, K., and J. Kreutz. 2019. "Natural Resource Wars in the Shadow of the Future: Explaining Spatial Dynamics of Violence during Civil War." *Journal of Peace Research* 56 (4): 499–513. doi:10.1177/0022343318821174
- Humphreys, M. 2005. "Natural Resources, Conflict, and Conflict Resolution." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 508–37. doi:10.1177/0022002705277545
- Jackson, A. 2018. "Life under the Taliban Shadow Government." ODI. Accessed 20 June. <https://odi.org/en/publications/life-under-the-taliban-shadow-government/>
- Kalyvas, S.N. 2006. *The Logic of Violence in Civil War*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Loyle, C., and H. M. Binningsbo. 2018. "Justice during Armed Conflict: A New Dataset on Government and Rebel Strategies." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 62 (2): 442–66. doi:10.1177/0022002716655441
- Lujala, P. 2010. "The Spoils of Nature: Armed Civil Conflict and Rebel Access to Natural Resources." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (1): 15–28. doi:10.1177/0022343309350015
- Lyll, J. 2010. "Are Coethnics More Effective Counterinsurgents? Evidence from the Second Chechen War." *American Political Science Review* 104 (1): 1–20. doi:10.1017/S0003055409990323
- Lyll, J., Y. Zhou, and K. Imai. 2020. "Can Economic Assistance Shape Combatant Support in Wartime? Experimental Evidence from Afghanistan." *American Political Science Review* 114 (1): 126–43. doi:10.1017/S0003055419000698
- Mampilly, Z. 2011. *Rebel Rulers: Insurgent Governance and Civilian Life during War*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Mejia, D., and D. Rico. 2010. „La microeconomia de la produccion y trafico de cocaína en Colombia.“ Technical Report, Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Economico.
- Mejia, D., and P. Restrepo. 2013. "Bushes and Bullets: Illegal Cocaine Markets and Violence in Colombia." Documentos CEDE 011934, Universidad de los Andes - CEDE.
- Olson, M. 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development." *The American Political Science Review* 87 (3): 567–76. doi:10.2307/2938736
- Panel Municipal de CEDE. 2015. „Centro de Estudios sobre Desarrollo Económico (CEDE).“ Accessed March 2016. <https://datoscede.uniandes.edu.co/>
- Peters, G. 2010. *Seeds of Terror*. New York: Picador.
- Rangel Suarez, A. 2000. "Parasites and Predators: Guerrillas and the Insurrection Economy of Colombia." *Journal of International Affairs* 53(2): 577–601.
- Rigterink, A. 2020. "Diamonds, Rebel's and Farmer's Best Friend: Impact of Variation in the Price of a Lootable, Labor-Intensive Natural Resource on the Intensity of Violent Conflict." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 64 (1): 90–126.
- Ritter, E. 2014. "Policy Disputes, Political Survival, and the Onset and Severity of State Repression." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 58 (1): 143–68. doi:10.1177/0022002712468724
- Rodado, R.L. 2006. "Ofensiva contra coca de FARC en Córdoba."
- Sanchez De La Sierra, R. 2020. "On the Origins of the State: Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo Stationary Bandits and Taxation in Eastern Congo." *Journal of Political Economy* 128 (1): 32–74. doi:10.1086/703989
- Shaver, A., and J. Shapiro. 2021. "The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 65(7–8):1337–1377.
- Snyder, R., and R. Bhavnani. 2005. "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 563–97. doi:10.1177/0022002705277796

- Staniland, P. 2012. "Organizing Insurgency: Networks, Resources, and Rebellion in South Asia." *International Security* 37 (1): 142–77. doi:[10.1162/ISEC_a_00091](https://doi.org/10.1162/ISEC_a_00091)
- Stewart, M. 2018. "Civil War as State-Making: Strategic Governance in Civil War." *International Organization*, 72(1): 205–226. doi:[10.1017/S0020818317000418](https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818317000418)
- Stewart, M., and Y. Liou. 2017. "Do Good Borders Make Good Rebels? Territorial Control and Civilian Casualties." *The Journal of Politics* 79 (1): 284–301. doi:[10.1086/688699](https://doi.org/10.1086/688699)
- UNODC. 2014. "Colombia Monitoreo de Cultivos de Coca 2013."
- Weinstein, J.M. 2005. "Resources and the Information Problem in Rebel Recruitment." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49 (4): 598–624. doi:[10.1177/0022002705277802](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002705277802)
- Wood, R. 2010. "Rebel Capability and Strategic Violence against Civilians." *Journal of Peace Research* 47 (5): 601–14. doi:[10.1177/0022343310376473](https://doi.org/10.1177/0022343310376473)
- Wood, R. 2014. "Opportunities to Kill or Incentives for Restraint? Rebel Capabilities, the Origins of Support, and Civilian Victimization in Civil War." *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 31 (5): 461–80. doi:[10.1177/0738894213510122](https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213510122)
- Wright, A. 2016. "Economic Shocks and Rebel Tactics." HiCN Working Paper 232, The Institute of Development Studies - at the University of Sussex.